No Detail Found!

On price and service competition with substitutable goods.

Author(s)
Bin Wang School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, 100191, Beijing, China; School of Economics and Management, Dezhou University, Dezhou 253023, Shandong, China
Jing Wang School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, 100191, Beijing, China; School of Economics and Management, Dezhou University, Dezhou 253023, Shandong, China
Abstract
This research studies a case that two enterprises produce two different but substitutable goods. The consumer demand depends on two kinds of factors: prices and service levels of the product and substitutable product. This article is based on three scenarios: Nash Equilibrium, Enterprise Alliance and Stackelberg. Game-theoretic framework is applied to find the optimal solutions for every participant. This research has conclusions as follow. Firstly, if market base of one product increases or one product has some economic advantage in providing service, it benefits for itself but is bad for substitutable product. Secondly, enterprises will provide fewer services, gain fewer customers, but earn more profit in Enterprise Alliance than in Nash Equilibrium. Thirdly, when one enterprise is dominant, if substitutable goods influence its demand greatly, it will take the advantage to earn more profit; otherwise, it will give up the advantage to seek the Enterprise Alliance.
Publication Details
Page(s) 355-364
DOI DOI not available
Published Journal: Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology, Volume: 46, Issue: 1, Year: 2012

Request the full text from PASTIC

0

Citations

0

Downloads

81

Views