Author(s):
1. Eze Chinonso Michael:
Department of Statistics, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria
2. Bertrand Tchantcho:
Department of Mathematics,Ecole Normale Superieure
3. Fidelis Ifeanyi Ugwuowo:
Department of Statistics, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria
Abstract:
The vast interpretation of weight in weighted Shapley value has offered opportunities for different scheme in sharing the dividend of a coalition in a transferable utility game. In this paper, a new allocation scheme (which makes use of linear ranks as a weight function of an individual player) as well as its axiomatic characterization is proposed. The use of rank, a linear function of player's stand-alone value as a weight of an individual player is introduced and the dividend accruable to any coalition is shared in proportion to the player's rank. Also, the dual equivalence of the new method is presented. This method is feasible in all class of cooperative game with transferable utility unlike the proportional Shapley value of Beal et al. (2018) that is restricted to only individually positive and individually negative games.
Page(s):
237-251
DOI:
DOI not available
Published:
Journal: Pakistan Journal of Statistics, Volume: 37, Issue: 3, Year: 2021
Keywords:
Shapley value
,
dividend
,
standalone value
,
Rank
References:
References are not available for this document.
Citations
Citations are not available for this document.